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reform, while little occurred on tort reform, due to the opposition of Senate Democrats. Graham notes the polarized nature of contemporary politics, and argues that presidents now can rarely engage in bipartisanship, forming alliances with leaders of the opposing party. But the ability and willingness of Senate minorities to filibuster makes a purely partisan approach unrealistic. Instead, presidents must engage in cross-partisanship, combining solid support from their own party with just enough senators from across the aisle to win. This, of course, assumes that the president's party controls the U.S. House.

Not surprisingly, Graham tends to be sympathetic to the George W. Bush administration. His criticism of Bush is mostly limited to tactics, and to minor issues such as the support for ethanol production. He notes that Bush suffered some of his biggest losses when he failed to win over a significant number of Democrats (Social Security reform) or alienated his Republican base (immigration).

Bush on the Home Front is not a major work of academic political science. But it is well-grounded in contemporary scholarly literature and should provide a good basis for future work. Graham is unlikely to persuade many readers that George W. Bush was a major domestic policy president. But they will come away from this work with a better knowledge of the realities of policymaking in twenty-first-century Washington.

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Terrorizing Ourselves: Why U.S. Counterterrorism Policy Is Failing and How to Fix It by Benjamin H. Friedman, Jim Harper and Christopher A. Preble, eds. Washington, DC, CATO Institute Press, 2010. 324 pp. \$24.95.

This is one of the best books about the difficulties that nation states encounter in dealing with terrorism and the threat thereof and, more specifically, about the flawed U.S. policies in response to the attacks of September 11. The seven-page introduction by the three co-editors is a superb summary of the costly consequences of targeted nation states' tendencies to exaggerate the terrorist threat, fuel public fear, and thereby enlist support for overblown, ineffective, and counterproductive responses. The ensuing 12 chapters by scholars drawn from various fields deliver what the introductory section promises: they examine and illuminate the faulty premises and the problematic elements of U.S. counterterrorism policies of the last nine years.

Since understanding the enemy is a precondition for designing an effective strategy to deal with a particular foe, the first chapters are devoted to examining terrorist strategies, root causes, and choices and how such insights should inform counterterrorism policies. Drawing from her recent book,

How Terrorism Ends, Audrey Kurth Cronin provides a dose of hope with her conclusion that—like other terrorist organizations—al Qaeda, too, will end or move to another kind of violence provided that the United States and its allies pursue a long-term counter-strategy to the multifaceted terrorist strategy instead of focusing on short-term tactics. Both James Forest and Mia Bloom reject simplistic explanations of the root causes for breeding terrorism, such as poverty, education, rapid modernization, etc., and, instead, provide more-complex pictures of environments in which individuals and organizations make choices to resort to terrorism—or not. While not discounting the utility of limited military force against terrorists in particular situations, Paul Pillar and Christopher Preble caution that all-out military force—war—does not deter further terrorism, tends to have detrimental effects, and comes at the expense of more-promising non-military measures.

James A. Lewis, John Mueller, and Veronique de Rugy lay bare the ineffective and costly nature of America's overblown terrorism threat assessments, the absence of cost-benefit analyses, and the politics surrounding homeland security subsidies to local jurisdictions along the lines of perennial pork barrel transactions. In spite of all the attention the threat receives, the risk of terrorist attacks killing Americans is very small in comparison to mortality risks. Yet, as James Lewis notes, for fiscal year 2010, President Obama requested \$55 billion for the Department of Homeland Security alone—"more than the military budgets of all other nations except China" (p. 97). If one adds more than \$1 trillion for the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq so far, Osama bin Laden's declared goal of weakening U.S. economic muscle seems less far-fetched than when he articulated this objective years ago.

Although many politicians and scholars have warned for years that terrorists will soon attack with weapons of mass destruction, John Mueller (chapter on nuclear terrorism) and Milton Leitenberg (chapter on bioterrorism) make convincing cases for a rational assessment of the risk of catastrophic terrorism. While not deeming weapons of mass destruction terrorism impossible, they consider the likelihood of a nuclear attack "vanishingly small" (p. 149), and thus far, efforts by groups to develop, acquire, or use biological agents as "remarkably limited" (p. 165).

Since terrorist attacks are designed to spread fear and intimidate the targeted society, the final three chapters by Benjamin H. Friedman, Priscilla Lewis, and William Burns shed light on the origins of post-September 11 public fear—including decision makers', the media's, and certain terrorism experts' tendency to exaggerate the terrorist threat. While the authors provide sound suggestions for new crisis communication approaches that inform the public about the true risk of terrorism, it is difficult to imagine drastic changes that would require public officials "to downplay the terrorist threat" (p. 203).

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