

Du yuan au J-20

22 janvier 2011 — Depuis les diverses agitations enregistrées autour de la révélation publique de l'existence de l'avion de combat J-20, une évolution est perceptible dans les milieux du Complexe, et particulièrement au Pentagone avec les divers commentateurs qui accompagnent l'évolution du monstre *Moby Dick*. Il y a un passage de l'aspect technique entourant l'apparition du J-20, à la dimension stratégique, les deux logiques tendant désormais à évoluer d'une façon indépendante, selon leurs propres caractéristiques. L'aspect technique touche essentiellement le débat aux USA autour de la catastrophe du programme JSF. L'aspect stratégique, lui, est présenté comme beaucoup plus important.

Nous signalons quelques textes qui ont un rapport avec cette nouvelle logique (stratégique) qui touche le Pentagone.

- Ted Galen Carpenter, du CATO Institute, donne le [18 janvier 2011](#), une intéressante description de l'échec qu'a connu Robert Gates lors de sa visite en Chine, un peu avant la visite du président Hu à Washington. Or, selon la logique (stratégique) que nous allons développer, le véritable succès de la seconde (Hu aux USA) dépendait **directement** du succès de la première (Gates en Chine).

«January is turning out to be an eventful and potentially crucial month in the relationship between China and the United States. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates was in Beijing last week for discussions with Defense Ministry officials. Chinese President Hu Jintao arrives in Washington for a summit meeting with President Obama this week. These trips come on the heels of various spats over economic and military issues that have created a chill in the bilateral relationship.»

»The process of repairing that relationship appears to be off to a rocky start. A key objective of Secretary Gates was to get China's military leadership to agree to a wide-ranging dialogue on strategic issues, including nuclear weapons, ballistic missile defenses, space weapons, and cyber warfare. His hosts rebuffed his initiative, agreeing only to a very limited dialogue on such second-tier issues as combating piracy and cooperating on international peacekeeping missions. Chinese officials indicated that Washington would need some policy changes — especially moderate its willingness to sell arms to Taiwan — before a dialogue on larger strategic issues could take place. The most the Defense Ministry would agree to do in the meantime was “study” Gates' broader proposal.»

»The lack of a meaningful military dialogue frustrates a persistent U.S. goal — to get Beijing to be more transparent regarding both the level of its military spending and the extent of its geopolitical ambitions — especially in East Asia and the Western Pacific. Recent reports of China's possible breakthroughs in nuclear technology and stealth aircraft have intensified Washington's concerns...»

- On mentionnera l'article d'Andrew Cockburn, sur *CounterPunch*, le [17 janvier 2011](#). Cockburn fait un parallèle entre les alarmes US à l'égard des "percées" technologique soviétiques durant la Guerre froide, et la situation actuelle vis-à-vis de la Chine, pour arguer de l'absence totale de fondement de ces manœuvres d'intoxication. Cette idée, qui peut être d'ailleurs discutée, n'est pas ce qui intéresse notre propos, mais bien pour la conclusion à laquelle tout cela conduit : *«Unfortunately, while some may applaud a Chinese initiative to spend the money that Wal-Mart sends them on a weapon of dubious utility, we too may end up paying a price, as the "threat" of China's J-20 is invoked to justify further increases in our own obscenely bloated defense budget.»*

- ...Effectivement, si l'on en croit l'impressionnant Daniel Goure (Lexington Institute, *Early Warning*, le [19 janvier 2011](#)), il est temps de penser à maintenir, non, – à augmenter le budget de la défense : *«Proposed investments in a new strategic bomber, sea-based unmanned aerial systems, space launch capabilities and advanced missile defenses are the first steps in a new program to make aggression unattractive to future Chinese leaders. Along with continued investments in nuclear attack submarines, aircraft carriers and multi-mission surface combatants, these new programs can send the necessary message to Beijing that the path to the future must be a peaceful one.»*

En effet, selon Goure, on se trouve engagé sur une voie qui ne peut conduire qu'à un conflit, devant la détermination de la Chine de suivre une voie évidemment agressive, au contraire de toutes les pacifiques et amicales démonstrations des USA.

«The United States, indeed the entire world, has offered China a peaceful path towards a place as a great power. However, if a combination of overweening nationalism, hubris and egoism, China continues on a path of posing a direct and growing threat to U.S. vital national interests, this country must be willing to take the necessary actions to counter the Chinese military threat.

»If Beijing continues on its current path of seeking to pose a military challenge to the United States then Washington will have no recourse but to reconsider its economic ties with that country. Chinese efforts to use access to its markets as leverage in its commercial relations with Western companies are becoming extremely onerous. As the largest holder of our public debt, China's military buildup is being paid for by U.S. interest payments. This cannot continue in the face of a more confrontational posture by Beijing. The risk is of a self-reinforcing cycle in which Chinese military aggressiveness provokes an economic backlash by the United States that produces, in turn, domestic political upheavals in China that are met by a decision by that country's government to act in an even more belligerent manner. A similar situation between Imperial Japan and the United States ended with the attack on Pearl Harbor.»